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Summary
Ghana: Progress, Problem atics and L im itations o f  the 
Success Story
Regina/il Herbold Green
G hana is cited by advocates as the key case ol successful 
adjustm ent, and  by critics as ad justm en t w ith an  inhum an  lace.
Both views are reductionist and  fail to  take on bo ard  the 1890-1982 
h istorical context. G h a n a ’s stab ilisation  effo rt, begun in 1982, was 
altered  to  secure F u n d /B an k  backing  in 1983. The added  resource 
inflows, the end o f  d rough t an d  the policy change have resulted in 
significant m acroeconom ic recovery. The sustainab ility  o f  tha t 
record  is prob lem atic  but fa r  from  hopeless. But hum an  cond itions 
have not im proved com parab ly  because —  at least until 19S2 —  the 
p oo r were trea ted  as peripheral, and  even now  p roduction  by and  
basic services for the poor are  not priorities well in teg rated  in to  the 
m acroeconom ic policy and  allocation  fram ew ork.
Togo: A Structural Adjustment that D estabilises Econom ic  
Growth
Jan Toporowski
Togo is a tiny, poor coun try  tha t has been alm ost entirely  
dependent on foreign econom ic assistance since the co llapse o f  the 
phosphate boom  in the m id-1970s. D eveloping a K aleckian m odel 
o f  foreign aid as supp lem enting  and  sm oo th ing  export revenue 
fluctuations, this article show s how  W orld Bank and  IM F 
program m es are destabilising  econom ic activity in Togo.
Structural Adjustment and Vulnerable Groups in Sierra  
Leone
Richard longhurst, Samura Kamara and Joseph Mensurah 
The m ajor elem ents o f  a stru c tu ra l ad ju stm en t package in Sierra 
Leone com prised flo tation  o f  the leone in Ju n e  1986 and  rem oval o f 
subsidies on rice and  petro l. By A pril 1987 the leone had  
depreciated by 90 per cent (from  L.e6 =  $1 to  Le50 = $1). and  the 
price o f  a cup o f rice had increased 2 ‘/:-3 tim es. The m onthly  cost o f 
severely reduced m eals for a fam ily o f five was ab o u t LelOOO. which 
should  be com pared  w ith a m inim um  governm ent w age o f  Le250. 
P roducer prices for m ajor export crops and  rice were also  increased 
substantially . But the in tended incentive effects have been 
dam pened by the im m ediate increased input and  living costs faced 
by rural families. The rigid IM F  m easures and  the ir selective 
im plem entation have w orsened the position  o f  the poor.
Policv Reform and Adjustment in an Econom y under Siege: 
Malawi 1980-87
Jonathan Kydd
The article provides an overview o f ad justm en t policies and  the 
perform ance o f the econom y since 1980. It sets o u t distinctive 
features o f M alaw i's politics and  econom y which have to  be taken  
into account in assessing the econom y. T he evidence concern ing  the 
effectiveness o f the ad justm ent policies is am biguous, because o f  a 
continuing  deterio ration  in the external ev ironm ent.
The Impact o f Adjustment Policy in M adagascar
Philippe Htigon
D uring the 1970s M adagascar experienced econom ic d isfunctioning  
and  financial disequilibrium  linked to  a planned econom y. She has 
since progressively liberalised the econom y and  in troduced 
adjustm ent policies. In the short te rm , these reduced financial
d isequ ilib rium , but this was achieved by ad justing  dow n, w ithout 
the revival o f  econom ic g row th  and  ou tside  com petition . The 
q uestion  rem ains w hether in the longer te rm  new ad ju stm en t 
policies will allow  for econom ic recovery , given the s tru c tu ra l 
n a tu re  o f  the econom ic  crisis.
Zam bian Adjustment Strategy —  With and Without the IMF
Christopher Colclough
Z a m b ia 's  ad ju stm en t to  the incom e loss caused by the fall in the 
co p p e r price was pa rtia l and  postponed . T he gap  was financed by 
b o rrow ing , w hich led to  un su p p o rtab le  debt repaym ent obligations. 
E conom ic  reform s, which were finally in troduced  at IM F  behest, 
w ere rad ical. The speed and  severity o f  in ternal incom e changes 
w hich resulted  —  particu larly  from  the liberalisation  o f the 
exchange ra te  —  destabilised  the society and  led to  a rejection o f 
refo rm . T he Z am bian  case underlines the eno rm ous costs  o f  forcing 
a governm ent to  m ove fu rth e r an d  faster than  the dom estic  political 
s tru c tu re  will allow .
S trateg ic  Adjustment and Stabilisation in a H ydrocarbon  
Exporter: The C ase o f Algeria
A mar Siahdelhadi and Reginald Herbold Green 
A lgeria has ca rried  out a nationally  in stitu ted  strateg ic  adjustm ent 
and  a sho rt te rm  s tab ilisa tion  exercise —  in th a t o rder. W hile it has 
ad o p ted  a p ro -ag ricu ltu ra l incentives policy (w ith positive results), 
p a rtia l liberalisation  o f  prices, a b ro ad e r p riva te  sec to r role , it has 
d one so w ithin the fram ew ork  o f a centrally  p lanned  econom y 
com m itted  to  very high levels o f  ca p ita l fo rm ation . Its 1986-87 
stab ilisa tio n  policy (w ith no app lica tion  to  the IM F) has been 
extrem ely  auste re  w ith 70 to  75 per cent o f  te rm s o f  trad e  (oil and  
gas) expo rt and  governm ent revenue losses covered by cuts in 
im ports  an d  governm ent expend itu re. W hile basic services and  rural 
deve lopm ent were p ro tec ted  real w ages were no t, an d  severe 
p riva tion  was experienced and  d issatisfaction  expressed by w orkers. 
As o f  m id -1987 s tab ilisa tion  w ithin the con tex t o f  th e  preced ing  
s tra teg ic  ad ju stm en t has succeeded an d  been eased w ith the 
(accu ra te ly  p red ic ted ) recovery o f  oil prices.
N on-m arginal Price Changes: C onditions for the Su ccess of  
Floating Exchange Rate System s in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Charles Harvey
A nu m b er o f  A frican  co un tries  recently  chose o r  were forced to  
increase the cost o f  foreign  exchange by
100 per cent o r m ore . T h is failed to  stab ilise the exchange ra te , and  
the re was little evidence o f  increasing  expo rts. Possible reasons for 
fa ilu re  included unchanged spend ing  com bined  w ith a lloa ting  rate, 
an d  lack o f  p roducer confidence in the new system  w hen it was 
im posed  by outsiders. F acto rs  leading  to  success shou ld  be 
identified  if s im ilar experim en ts arc to  be forced on A frica.
From Speeches to Action: Im plem enting What is Agreed
Richard Jolly
S tab ilisa tion  policy and  practice w ere initially ab s trac ted  from  what 
w ere seen as tran sitio n a l costs an d  from  the ir im pact on  p o o r  and 
vu lnerab le  people. In te rm s o f  policy p ronouncem en ts  there has 
been d ram atic  change since 1985. Linder various title s, ’A djustm ent 
W ith  A H um an  F ace ' an d  the ‘h um an  d im ension ’ o f  econom ic 
recovery  are now  alm ost universally  accepted  in concep tual term s. 
But practice —  as m easured  b o th  by the type o f  p rio rity  da ta  
sough t an d  used and  by resource a llocations  — lags well behind. 
T he presen t challenge is to  articu la te  these concep ts in concre te  
cases and  to  achieve resource a llocations  ad eq u a te  to  ac t upon  
them .
Resumé
L’Im paele de la Politique d’Ajustement á M adagascar
Philippe Hugon
M adagascar a connu  d u ra n t la décennie 70 les m alfonctionnem ents 
et les déséquilibres financiers liés á une econom ic plannifiée. Elle a 
progressivem ent depu is liberalise son économ ie el app liqué des 
politiques d 'a ju s tem en t. Cclles-ci o n t á courl term e réduit les 
déséquilibres financiers m ais pa r un ajustem ent pa r le bas et sans 
reprise de la cro issance économ ique et de la com pétitiv ité  externe.
A plus long term e, les po litiques d ’ajustem ent perm etteront-elies 
une reprise de l'économ ic  vu le carac té re  struc tu rc l de la crise 
économ ique?
Ghana: Progrés, les Points de Contention et les Lim itations 
d'un Succés
Reginald Herbold Green
G h an a  est cité p a r ses su ppo rte rs  com m e le cas exem plaire du 
succés d ’un a justem ent et pa r ses critiques com m e un ajustem ent au 
visage inhum ain . C es deux poin ts  de vue sont réductionistes et ne 
p rennen t pas en considé ra tion  le contexte h isto rique des années 
1890 á 1982. L ’effo rt de stab ilisation  faite au G h an a  et qui 
com m enga en 1982, a été m odifié en 1983, p o u r assu rer í’ob ten lion  
du sou tien  financier des banques. L ’afflux de resources 
supp lém enta ires, la fin de la sécheresse et le changem ent de 
po litique  on t résulté dans un redressem ent m acro-économ ique 
considerable. La m ain tenance  de ce record  est prob lém atique mais 
loin d ’etre  sans espo ir. N éanm oins, Ies cond itions hum aines ne se 
sont pas am m elio rées com parativem ent parce que —  du m oins 
depuis 1982 — le pauvre  a été tra ité  com m e périphérique et 
au jo u rd ’hui encore la p roduction  du pauvre et les services de base 
p o u r  le pauvre ne son t pas considérés com m e des prio rités et ne 
sont pas bien in tégrés dans les prises de m esures au niveau m acro- 
économ ique et d ans  le cadre de la répartition .
Togo: Un Ajustement Structural qui D estab ilise la 
Croissance économ ique
Jan Toporowski
Le T ogo  est un pays pauvre , m inuscule qui a été presque to talem ent 
dépendan t d ’une assistance économ ique étrangére  depuis 
fe ifo n d re m en t du bourn du p hosphate  au milieu des années 70. En 
déve loppan t un m odé le de K aleck d ’aide étrangére  com m e un 
supp lém ent et un m oyen de régu lation  de la fluc tuation  des revenus 
á l’exp o rta tio n . cet artic le  m o n tre  com m e la B anque M ondiale et les 
program m es de l’IM F  o n t déstabilisé  l’activ ité économ ique du 
Togo.
Ajustement Structural et Les Groupes Vulnerables en Sierra 
Leone
Richard Longhurst, Samara Kamara. et Joseph Mensurah 
Les élém ents m ajeurs du p rogram m e d ’ajustem ent stru c tu ra l en 
S ierra Leone. com p ren n en t la flo ta tion  du  Leone en Ju in  1986 et le 
retrait des ap p rov isionnem en ts  en riz et essence. En Avril 1987. le 
Leone ava il subi une baisse de 90% (de Le6 =  SI a Le50 =  S I), et le 
prix de la m esure de riz avaít augm enté de deux et dem i á tro is fois 
son prix. Le coú t m ensucl des repas, sévérem ent réduits p ou r une 
fam ille de cinq personnes é ta it d ’environ  1000 Le, ce qui devrait 
étre com paré  avec un sala irc gouvernem enta l m inim um  de 250 Le. 
Les prix des p ro d u c teu rs  p o u r les expo rta tions  les plus im portan tes 
de p rodu its  agricoles et de riz avaien t aussi augm enté 
substan tiellem ent. M ais les effects de s tim u la tion  qui avaient été 
prévus, on t été étouffés p a r l’augm en ta tio n  du  rendem ent et du coút 
de la vie auquel les fam ilies du  secteur rural on t du  faire face. Les 
m esures rigides de l 'IM F  et leur en forcem ent sélectif on t eu pour 
effect de dég rader enco re  plus la position  du pauvre.
Politique de Reforme et d’Ajustement dans un Econom ie 
Assiégée: M alawi 1980-87
Jonathan Kydd
Cet artic le  nous d onne  une vue d ’cnsem ble des m esures
d 'a ju stem en t et des achévem ents de l’économ ie depuis 1980. II 
présente les charactéres d istinctifs de la po litique  du M alaw i et de 
son économ ie qui doivent étre pris en considé ra tion  dans 
l’assessem ent de l'économ ie. I.’évidence concernan t l’effectivité des 
mesures d ’ajustem ent est am bigüe, á cause d ’une dété rio ra tio n  
continuelle dans l’env ironem ent externe.
La Stratégie d’Ajustement Zam bienne —  Avec ou Sans le 
IMF
Christopher Colclough
L’ajustem ent de la Zam bie á la perte de revenu causée p a r la ch u te  
du prix du cuivre a été parliel et re tardé. Le déficit a été financé par 
un em prun t ayant p o u r conséqucncc d ’insou tenab les ob liga tions 
pour le repaiem ent de cette dette . D es réform es économ iques, 
finalem ent in trodu ites sur l’o rd re  de l’IM F  fu ren t rad icales. La 
vitesse et la sévérité des changem ents dans le revenu in terne qu i en a 
résulté — en particu liers á cause de ia libéralisation  du  taux de 
change — a déstab ilisé la société et condu it au  rejet des réform es.
Le cas de la Zam bie souligne le coú t énorm e d ’une a ttitu d e  qui 
force les gouvernem ent á aller plus loin et p lus vite que la s tru c tu re  
politique in terne ne lui perm ette.
Ajustement Stratégique et Stabilisation chez un Exportateur 
d’Hydrocarbone: Le Cas de l’Algérie
Amar Siabdelhadi et Reginald Herbold Green 
L ’Algérie a m ené á bien une stratégie app liquée  au  n iveau  na tio n a l 
et un exercise de stab ilisation  á court te rm e — d ans cet o rd re . A lors 
q u ’elle ad o p ta it une politique de stim ulation  pro -agrico le , (avec des 
résu ltats positifs), la liberalisation  partielle  des prix . I’ex tension  du 
role jo u é  p a r le secteur privé, elle l 'a  fait au sein d ’un plan 
d ’économ ie centralisée, engagée dans la mise en place d ’un trés hau t 
niveau de capitaux. Sa politique de s tab ilisa tion  en 1986-87 (sans 
dem ande au IM F) a m arque une période ex trém em ent au sté re  avec 
de 70 a 75% de perte dans la balance des paiem ents á  l’expo rt 
(pétro le  et gaz) et su r le revenu gouvernem enta l, couverte  p a r des 
réductions á l’im porta tion  et dans les dépenses du gouvernem ent. 
A lors que les services de base et le développem ent rural étaien t 
protégés, les salaires réels ne le furent pas, et les ouvriers  fíren t 
l’experience de sévéres priva tions et exprim éren t un p ro fond  
m écontentem ent. A p a rtir  du milieu de l’année  1987, une 
stab ilisation  dans le contexte de l’ajustem ent s tra tég ique  se p rouva 
un succés facilite par la rem ontée (prevision qu i s ’est averée ju ste ) 
des prix du pétrole.
Changements des prix non-marginaux: C onditions pour le 
succés du flottement des system es des taux de Change en 
Afrique Sub-Saharienne
Charles Harvev
U n certain  nom bre de pays africains on t choisi récem m ent ou on t 
été forcé d ’augm enter le coút du  change é tran g er de 100% ou plus. 
Ceci n’a pas réussi á stab iliser le taux du change, et il a peu 
d ’évidence d ’une augm entation  des expo rta tions. A u nom bre  des 
raisons possibles de cet échec, ftgurait une com b in a tio n  de la 
m aintenance des dépenses et d ’un taux  f lo ttan t, et aussi le m anque 
de confiance de la part du p roducteu r. dans u n  nouveau  systém e oú  
il se trouva it étre im posé de l’extérieur. Les facteurs condu isan t au 
succés devraient étre identifiés si des ten tatives sem blables se 
doivent étre ¡mposées de nouveau á l’A frique.
D es D iscours á l’Action: M ettre en Place ce qui a été 
Convenu
Richard Jolly
La théorie et la p ratique de la s tab ilisation  o n t été tirées á I’orig ine 
de ce qui était considéré com m e étan t les coú ts tran sito ires et leur 
im pacte sur les individus pauvres et vulnérables. En ce qui concerne 
les déclarations des prises de m esures, il y a eu un changem ent 
radical depuis 1985. Sous différents entétes, ‘A justem ent á Visage 
H um ain ’ et la ‘dim ension hum aine’ du redressem ent économ ique 
sont m ain tenan t p ratiquem ent universellem ent adop tes en ta n t que 
term es conceptuéis. M ais la p ra tique  — com m e elle a  été m esurée á 
la fois par le type de données recherchées et utilisées, et p a r les 
a llocations de resource —  est restée en arriére. Le défi actuel c’est 
d ’exprim er ces conceptes dans des cas concre ts  et de m ener á bien 
les allocations adéquates de resources afín de les cxécuter.
Resumen
Gana: Progreso, problemas y lim itaciones de una historia 
exitosa
Reginald Herbokl Creen
G ana es citada com o el caso  clave de ajuste exitoso po r sus 
sim patizantes v com o e! de un ajuste con ro stro  inhum ano  por sus 
detractores. A m bas visiones son esquem áticas e ignoran  el con tex to  
histórico  de 1890-1982. El esfuerzo estabilizador de G an a , iniciado 
en 1982, fue alterado  en 1983 para asegurar el apoyo  del 
F ondo /B an co . Los flujos de recursos adicionales, el tin de la sequia 
y el cam bio  de política p rodu je ron  una recuperación 
m aeroeconóm ica significativa. La m antención de lo logrado  es 
problem ática pero no im posible. N o obstan te , las condiciones 
hum anas no han  m ejo rado  en térm inos com parativos, deb ido  a 
que. al menos hasta  1982, los pobres fueron tra tad o s  com o 
m arginales y aún ah o ra  la producción realizada po r ellos y los 
servicios básicos para ellos, no constituyen  p rioridades in tegradas 
adecuadam ente en la estruc tu ra  de la política y d istribución  
económ icas.
Togo: un ajuste estructural que desestabíliza el crecim iento  
económico
Jan Toporowski
Togo es un país d im inu to  y pobre que, desde el co lapso  de la 
bonanza del fosfato  ocu rrida  a m ediados de la década de 1970, se 
ha vuelto casi to talm en te dependiente de la asistencia económ ica 
exterior. M ediante el uso de un m odelo kaleckiano de ayuda 
externa, que sum plem enta y a tenúa las fluc tuaciones de los ingresos 
provenientes de las exportaciones, este artícu lo  dem uestra  com o los 
p rogram as del FM I v del Banco M undial están  desestab ilizando  la 
actividad económ ica en T ogo.
Sierra Leona: ajuste estructural y grupos vulnerables
Richard Longhurst, Samara Samara v Joseph Mensurah 
Los elem entos principales del paque te del a juste es truc tu ra l en 
Sierra Leona incluyeron, en ju n io  de 1986, la flo tación  de la 
m oneda local y la elim inación de los subsidios al a rro z  y al 
petróleo. En abril de 1987. la m oneda local se hab ía deprec iado  en 
90% (de Le6 =  $1 a Le50 =  $1) y el precio de una taza de a rroz  
había subido entre 2,5 y 3 veces. El costo  m ensual de las colaciones, 
severam ente reducidas, p a ra  una fam ilia de 5 personas era 
aproxim adam ente Le 1.000, cifra que debe com parase con el salario  
mínim o del sector público que asciende a Le 250. Los precios al 
p roductor, de granos de exportación  y a rro z , tam bién  subieron  
substancialm ente. No obstan te , los efectos incentivadores 
intentados, fueron am ortiguados po r el alza inm edia ta  de los costos 
de vida y de insum os en el m edio rural. Las rígidas m edidas del 
FM I y su selectiva im plcm enlación han em peorado  la s ituación  de 
los pobres.
Malawi 1980-87. Reforma política y ajuste en una econom ía  
sitiada
Jonathan Kydd
Este artículo p roporciona una revisión de las políticas de ajuste y de 
la trayectoria económ ica desde 1980. D estaca las características 
politicoeconóm icas relevantes de M alawi, que deben considerarse 
en la evaluación de su econom ía. La evidencia relativa a la eficacia 
de las políticas de ajuste es am bigua a causa del co n tinuo  deterio ro  
del am biente exterior.
El impacto de la política de ajuste en M adagascar
Philippe Hugon
D urante la década de 1970, M adagascar experim entó  desequilibrios 
functionales y financieros vinculados a la econom ía p lanificada. 
Desde entonces, liberalizó la econom ía e in trodu jo  políticas de
ajuste . En el co rto  plazo, éstas redu jeron  el desequilibrio  financiero , 
p e ro  esto  se logró a ju stan d o  hacia abajo  sin considerar el 
crec im ien to  económ ico y la com petencia exterior. D adu la 
na tu ra lez a  es truc tu ra l de la crisis económ ica , queda po r ac la ra r si, 
en el la rgo  p lazo , nuevas políticas de ajuste  p e rm itirán  la 
recuperación  económ ica .
La estrategia de ajuste de Zam bia con y sin el FMI
Christopher Cok tough
El ajuste  de Z am bia  a la pérd ida de ingreso  o rig inada  por la caída 
del precio  del cobre fue parcial y postergado . La b recha fue 
financiada  con prestam os que condu jeron  a in to lerables 
obligaciones de pago de la deuda, l as refo rm as económ icas que 
fina lm ente se in tro d u je ro n , p o r o rden  del FM I, fueron  radicales. La 
velocidad  y severidad  de los cam bios en el ingreso in terno , 
resu ltan tes  p a rticu larm en te  de la liberalización  de la tasa de 
cam b io , desestab ilizaron  la sociedad  y p rodu je ron  el rechazo de las 
refo rm as. El caso de Z am bia ilustra  el enorm e costo  que im plica 
fo rza r a un gob ie rno  a ir m ás lejos y m ás ráp ido  que  lo que perm ite 
la es tru c tu ra  política nacional.
Ajuste estratégico y estabilización en un exportador de 
petróleo. El caso de Argelia
Amar Siabdelhadi y  Reginald Hcrhold Creen 
A rgelia ha llevado a  cabo  sucesivam ente , un a ju ste  estra tég ico  
n ac ionalm en te  instituc ionalizado  v un ejercicio de estabilización  de 
co rto  plazo. En el con tex to  de una econom ía ce n tra lm en te  
p lan ificada , co m prom etida  con niveles muy a lto s  de fo rm ación  de 
cap ita l, el país ad o p tó  una política de incentivos ag ríco las que tuvo 
resu ltados positivos, liberalización  parcial de precios y un rol m ás 
am p lio  del sec to r privado . Su política de estabilización  de 1986-87. 
sin ingerencia del F M I. fue ex trem adam en te  au ste ra  cub riendo  
en tre  un 70% y 75% de las pérd idas de las exportac iones e ingreso 
g u b ernam en ta l, o rig inadas p o r el d e te rio ro  de los té rm inos de 
in tercam b io  —  petró leo  y gas — con cortes en las im portac iones y 
gasto  público . M ientras que los servicios básicos y el desarro llo  
ru ra l fueron  pro teg idos, no  occurrió  lo m ism o con  los sa la rios, lo 
que o rig inó  privaciones que fueron  m otivo  de  p ro te sta  po r parte  de 
los trabajado re s. D esde m ediados de 1987. den tro  del con tex to  del 
ajuste  estra tég ico  precedente , la estab ilización  ha sido  exitosa y 
m itigada por la recuperación  de los precios del pe tró leo , 
p ronosticada  con precisión.
C am bios de precios no m arginales. C ondiciones para el éxito  
de sistem as de tasas de cam bio flotantes en el Subsahara
Charles Harvey
V arios paises africanos decid ieron  o fueron  ob ligados a increm entar 
el costo  de las divisas en un 100% o m ás. E sto  fracasó  en estab ilizar 
la tasa de cam bio  y el inc rem ento  de las expo rtac iones  fue escaso. 
Las posibles causas del fracaso  incluyen la no  m odificación  del 
g asto  ju n to  a una tasa flo tan te  y las fa lta  de con fianza  de los 
p ro d u c to res  en el nuevo sistem a, im puesto  p o r fo ráneos. Si se desea 
im poner experim entos sim ilares en Á frica, deben  identificarse los 
facto res que  conduzcan  al éxito.
D e la palabra a la acción. Implementar lo acordado
Richard Jolly
In ic ialm ente las políticas y prác ticas de estabilización  hicieron 
abstracción  ta n to  de los que se conside raron  costos tran sito rio s  
com o de su im pacto  sobre las personas pobres y vulnerables. Desde 
1985 se ha  p roduc ido  un vuelco en los té rm inos de 
p ro n u n c iam ien to  de políticas, a ta l p u n to  de que ad jetivos tales 
com o ‘ajuste con ro s tro  h u m a n o ’ y ‘la d im ensión  h u m a n a - de la 
recuperación  económ ica son ac tualm en te  acep tad o s  casi 
un iversa lm ente com o térm inos concep tuales. N o o b s tan te , la 
p ráctica está  bas tan te  rezagada, tan to  en las p rio ridades  de los 
d a to s  buscados y usados, com o en la as ignación  de  los recursos. El 
desafio  ac tual reside en a rticu la r ta les concep to s en casos concretos 
y log ra r asignaciones adecuadas  de los recursos p a ra  o p era r sobre 
ellos.
Editorial: Do Stabilisation Policies Stabilise?
C h r i s t o p h e r  C o l c l o u g h  a n d  R e g i n a l d  H e r b o l d  G r e e n
In  on e  sense the perceived needs to stabil ise virtually  
all Afr ican  econom ies ,  and  to secure their  s truc tura l  
a d ju s tm e n t  to new external realities,  are no longer 
ju d g e d  co n tro v e rs ia l  bo th  within  an d  outside  the 
A fr ican  c o n t in en t .  It is now  widely accepted  tha t  
s tab il isa tion  — defined  as rem oving  un tenab le  m acro- 
econom ic  im ba lances  — has becom e essential.  But,  at 
a n o th e r  level, the d isag reem en ts  have intensified.  
Critical q u es t io n s  include the following: Does the 
c o m b in a t io n  o f  classic I M F  m ac ro eco n o m ic  d e m a n d  
m a n a g e m e n t  p lus l iberal isa tion  lead to stabilisa tion? 
If  so,  does  it d o  so at  the price o f  f rus t ra t ing  
ad ju s tm e n t  an d  renewed growth?  Are conventional  
ways o f  ad ju s t in g  m ac ro eco n o m ic  ba lances remotely  
g o o d  e n o u g h  if o th e r  h u m a n  im ba lances  —  such as 
high in fan t  m or ta l i ty ,  m a ln u t r i t io n ,  lack o f  access to 
basic  h ea l th  a n d  e d u ca t io n  services a n d  abso lu te  
poverty  —  b eco m e  m o re  ex tended  as a result? O r  is it 
th a t  ‘s tab il isa t ion  with an in h u m a n  face’ m ust  be 
ju d g ed  to  be professionally  (as well as hum an ly )  
i r responsib le?  Are the post-1980 IM F  p ro g ram m es  in 
Africa  classic ones fo u n d e d  in the Po lak  m odel  or  are 
they so m e th in g  new?
T h e  seven case  studies  in this vo lum e (Algeria ,  G h a n a ,  
M a d a g asc a r ,  M alaw i.  Sierra  Leone, T ogo ,  Z am b ia )  
an d  the two m o re  general  papers  (on ad ju s tm e n t  with 
a h u m a n  face, a n d  n o n -m arg in a l  exchange  rate  
changes)  c a n n o t  claim to answ er  these quest ions 
definitively. T hey  do ,  however,  pose them sharply; 
they a lso th ro w  light on the p ro b a b le  range  o f  answers 
a n d  cast g rave  d o u b t  on  c la ims tha t  — in any general 
sense —  ‘s tabil isa tion  is w o rk in g ’.
Even in its o w n  te rm s,  s tab il isa tion  is far f rom  being 
generally  successful.  O u r  s tudies sh o w  tha t  G h a n a  and  
Algeria  (w hose  p ro g ra m m e  was n a t iona l  a n d  in som e 
ways u n c o n v e n t io n a l )  have  stabil ised  at  a m acro-  
eco n o m ic  level but th a t  M a d a g asc a r ,  S ierra  Leone, 
T o g o  a n d  Z a m b ia  clearly have no t ,  an d  tha t  M a law i’s 
s tab il isa tion  looks increasingly unlikely.
As regards  the r e s to ra t io n  o f  sus ta inab le  G D P  
g ro w th ,  th e  pa t te rn  is sim ila r  —  except tha t  the 
longevity  o f  G h a n a ’s g ro w th  rem ains  open  to do u b t  
a n d  th a t  o f  Alger ia  h a d  barely  begun  by late 1987, tied 
as it was to  the pa r t ia l  recovery in the price of  
pe tro leum .  M ore  positively,  this does,  at least , suggest 
th a t  successful s tab i l isa t ion  is no t  inconsis tent  with  
s t ru c tu ra l  a d ju s tm e n t  an d  renewed  grow th .  However,
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causal ity  m a y  run  in the o p p o s i te  d i rec tion :  it c o u ld  be 
th a t  w i thou t  an  early renewal o f  g ro w th  ne ither  
s truc tura l  ad ju s tm en t  no r  s tab i l isa t ion  prove  to  be 
susta inable .
O ne  area  o f  divergence a m o n g s t  this g ro u p  o f  
countr ies  which a p p ea rs  to be  im p o r t a n t  is the 
b eh av io u r  o f  net resource  inflows (g ran ts  a n d  lo an s  
less interest  an d  repaym en ts) .  In cases where  these  did 
no t  rise — e.g. S ierra  L eone ,  T o g o ,  Z a m b ia ,  
M a d ag asca r  —  stab il isa tion  has n o t  been  successful in 
its own terms. Still less has it re s to red  s tab le  g ro w th  o r  
ha lted  general  d e te r io ra t io n  in the  h u m a n  con d it io n .  
O n  the o ther  hand ,  where net re sou rce  inflows have 
increased —  as in G h a n a  a n d  M alaw i  —  initial 
s tabilisa tion  objectives have been  met a n d  —  less 
clearly in M alaw i’s case —  g ro w th  has been res to red .  
T he  o u tco m e  as regards p ove r ty  a n d  d es t i tu t io n ,  
however,  even in those countr ies ,  rem ains  unclear.
In each o f  the coun tr ies  s tud ied  the  policy s tan ce  p r io r  
to the in t ro d u c t io n  o f  s tab il isa tion  m easu res  was in 
any  case un tenable  fo r  the longer term. In the absence  
o f  reforms, m ajo r  reduct ions  in public  spend ing ,  a n d  
in d e m a n d  m ore  generally  w ou ld  have been inevitable.  
Similarly the d is tr ibutive  im pac t  o f  p re -s tab i lisa t ion  
policies often  acted  agains t  the  in teres ts  o f  the  p o o re s t  
groups.  Criticism o f  the im pac t  o f  s tab il isa tion  
m easures,  therefore,  by no  m eans  implies the  
u n m it iga ted  desirability  o f  r e tu rn in g  to  a n  ear l ie r  
policy regime.
How ever,  specific targets for im p ro v em en ts  in the 
h u m an  condit ion  have n o t  fea tu red  in any  o f  the 
p ro g ram m es  (a l th o u g h  this is n o w  c h an g in g  to som e 
extent in G h an a) .  As a result,  the  p a r t icu la r  fo rm s  
taken  by cuts in subsidies, in real wages a n d  in real 
health  and  educa tion  expenditu res  u n d e r  these 
p ro g ram m es  did have high social costs. In Z am b ia ,  for  
exam ple ,  such costs explain m uch  o f  the  s t o p / g o  
his tory  o f  a decade  o f  s tab il isa tion  efforts  an d  
certainly the 1986/87 collapse o f  the latest  I M F /W o r l d  
B a n k -su p p o r ted  reform  p ro g ram m e.  O n the  o th e r  
hand ,  na tiona l  reform  p ro g ram m es  w ithou t  in te r­
na tiona l  su p p o r t  would  have fo u n d  it a lm os t  
impossible to take more account  o f  h u m a n  costs 
because they would  have faced still lower sta te  
resources and import  capacity. T he  G h a n a  p ro g ram m e  
o f  1982 encoun tered  this obstacle,  an d  it seems likely 
tha t  the na tionally  designed successor to the
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Ghana: Progress, Problematics and Limitations of the 
Success Story
R e g i n a l d  H e r b o l d  G r e e n 1
I lie small  boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his m o th e r  
‘It got b ro k e n ’ not ‘I b roke  the p o t ’ but i t  got 
b ro k e n ’ . . . and  who did this? We did.
We broke  the pot.
—  Je r ry  J o h n  Rawlings,  
C h a i rm a n  P N D C
Beginning Again — toward Work and 
Happiness or a New Illusion?
T h e  slogan  o f  K w am e  N k r u m a h ’s C onv en tio n  
Peo p le ’s Par ty  in the early  1960s was ‘W o rk  an d  
H ap p in ess  fo r  AH’. T he  semi-illicit op p o s i t io n  styled 
its e co n o m ic  c r it ique  i t  Will Not Be W ork  and  
H ap p in es s  fo r  A l l ’ a n d  when the C P P g o v e rn m e n t  was 
w ith d raw n  tw o  disillusioned E u ro p ea n  radicals styled 
their  revised p e rcep tions  ‘G h a n a :  E n d  o f  an I llusion'.  
Since 1983 the  G h a n a  e co n o m y  has been tu rn ed  
a ro u n d  to  beco m e  the  very m odel  o f  a m odern  
s tabilisa tion a n d  a d ju s tm en t  p r o g r a m m e ( I M F / W o r l d  
Bank va r ia n t) ,  a n d  the  Prov isiona l  N a t iona l  
D ev e lo p m en t  C ounc il  g o v e rn m e n t  instituted at the 
end  o f  1981 by re tired  F ligh t  L ieu tenan t  Je r ry  
Rawlings has c o m e  to  be perceived — especially in the 
N o r th  — as lead ing  G h a n a  at last to w ard  work  and  
happiness  for  all u n d e r  the p la ton ic  g u a rd ian sh ip  and  
tu te lage o f  the  F u n d  a n d  the  Bank.
O r  is this m ere ly  a new illusion? Is the  u n den iab le  
1983-87 o u tp u t  recovery a n y th in g  b u t  a w eather  
fuelled c law b ack  to the a lready  depressed  levels o f  the 
late 1970s? H as  it any  real chance  o f  con tinu ing?  Does 
fiscal a n d  m o n e ta ry  s tabil isa tion  rest on  any f irmer 
fo u n d a t io n  th an  cu tt in g  a lread y  to t te r ing  basic social 
service b u d g e ts  an d  b o r ro w in g  m ore  a b ro ad ?  Are even 
the ex te rna l  c red i ts  safe —  m uch  less the  p o o r  o f  
A ccra ’s N im a -M a m o b i  s lum , o f  the peripheral  
n o r th e rn  a n d  up p e r  regions,  let a lone  the infants and  
you n g  ch ild ren  whose m o r ta l i ty  rates seem to have 
begun to  rise, revers ing  a t ren d  o f  three  decades?  Even 
if it is e co n o m ica lly  sus ta in ab le ,  is this  ‘A d ju s tm en t
1 P rofessor G reen  has w orked in and  researched  on  G h an a  
periodically  since I960. F rom  1985 he has been involved, as a 
co n su ltan t to  U N IC E F' and  as a co n tr ib u to r  to  the W orld  Institu te  
o f D evelopm ent E conom ic R esearch  (W ID E R ) in a cross-country  
s tab ilisa tion  p ro jec t headed by Lance T aylor. T his article is an 
abb rev ia ted  an d  u p d a ted  version o f  the G h an a  case study  from  the 
W ID E R  project.
ID S  Rti/lctin, 19XX. vo! 19 no I. In s titu te  o f  D evelopm en t S tu d ie s. Sussex
with an In h u m a n  Face ’ —  the p re sum ptive  m ir ro r  
image o f  U N I C E F ’s ‘A d ju s tm en t  with a H u m a n  Fa c e ’?
These quest ions  m ay oversimplify — the glosses o f  
bo th  p ro p o n en ts  a n d  o p p o n e n ts  surely do. But they 
are serious quest ions  — especially for  the  people  o f  
G h a n a ,  but also for the F u n d  a n d  Bank whose  SSA 
m o d e l ’s prestige and  p e rhaps  even credibili ty  are  on 
the line in G h a n a .  As such they  deserve ser ious  
a t tem pts  at provisional,  partial  answers.
Black Star Rising — and Setting?
1983-87 canno t  be u n d e rs to o d  w ithou t  going back  to 
the late 1950s and  even, pe rhaps ,  the late 1890s. 
G h a n a ’s econom ic  history is n o t  pa r ticu la r ly  typical o f  
su b -S ah a ran  Africa, n o r  was its 1983 c on junc tu re .  T o  
view it as either is likely to  impede analysis.
In the period 1890-1910 the then G o ld  C o a s t ’s tree 
c rop  fa rm ers p ioneered  the W est  Afr ican  cocoa  
industry,  and  from  n o th in g  tu rn ed  their  co lony  into 
the w o r ld ’s largest  p ro d u cer  —  a posi t ion  G h a n a  held 
until  the late 1970s, peak ing  at the end  o f  the N k r u m a h  
period  at over 400,000 tonnes  rep resen t ing  over  40 per 
cent o f  world  o u tp u t .  E u ro p ea n  inves tm en t  in t im b e r  
ex trac t ion  an d  gold m in ing  —  plus re la ted  in f ra ­
s t ru c tu re  — as well as in external  a n d  wholesa le  t rade ,  
toge the r  with the cocoa  farm ers,  h a d  by 1910 c rea ted  
the m odern  G h a n a ia n  eco n o m y ,  an d  a five-year 
developm ent plan in the 1920s conso l ida ted  the 
physical an d  began build ing the h u m an  (hosp ita ls ,  
sixth form  college) infrastructure .
After  the p ro longed  depress ion  o f  the late 1920s an d  
1930s —  c o n tinued  by isolat ion  d u r in g  W o r ld  W a r  II 
— the G o ld  C o as t  e conom y experienced a renewal 
first o f  g row th  (within the  1910 p ro d u c t io n  a n d  1920s 
in f ras tru c tu re  f ram e) over 1947-57 a n d  then  an 
a t te m p ted  s t ruc tu ra l  ad jus tm en t  focused on industry  
(m an u fac tu r in g  an d  hydropow er) .  C ocoa ,  t im ber  
(with som e processing) an d  gold sp earheaded  the
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p ro d u c t io n /ex p o r t  g row th ,  the late colonial develop­
m ent effort (largely f inanced by the ba lances built  up 
from exports  in the  war period) the growth ot 
infras tructure .  A nd  so to independence  in 1957 as 
West A fr ica’s p remier colony, the showpiece of 
B r i ta in ’s T h ird  E m pire  and  o f  tu te lage for responsible  
black leadership (not that  K w am e N k ru m a h  an d  the 
C P P  had initially been the colonial regim e’s chosen 
agents for that t ransit ion  — far from it).
The N k ru m ah  period  was m arked  by a rush for g rowth  
and  for s truc tura l  change  based on high, sta te  led 
productive  an d  econom ic  sector in f ras truc tu re  an d  
hum an  investment,  especially in educa tion .  Until 1960 
the Black S tar ,  sym bol o f  G h a n a ,  s to o d  for s teady 
rises in o u tp u t ,  in inves tm ent,  in e d u ca t io n ,  in 
apparen t  mass p rosperi ty  an d  social welfare. 1 here 
were clouds — but they then a p p ea red  to be small  
ones. T he  world cocoa b o o m  was clearly over ( th an k s  
in large part  to the  explosive rise in G h a n a ia n  
production);  the g rowth  o f  food  p ro d u c tio n  had ,  with 
rapid urbanisation an d  unchanged  peasant  technology, 
begun to lag popu la t ion  growth by the middle  1950s; 
the high investment and  recurren t  sta ta l  and  
parasta ta l  spending was beginning to exert external 
balance and  (less clearly) in f la t ionary  pressures;  the 
northern  and  up p e r  regions (and  ad jacen t  districts) 
remained s tagnant  an d  pe r ipheral  to the eco n o m y  a n d  
polity.
In 1960-61 these stresses led to a mini external and  
internal balance crisis, t em porar i ly  resolved by a 
tough budget,  im port  and  foreign exchange con tro l  
and  con tinued  focusing on investing G h a n a  in to  the 
future. T hat  resolution was at best trans ito ry .  Over 
1961-65 world  cocoa  prices collapsed —  as d id g row er  
prices, a l though  the governm en t  m ain ta in ed  them  at 
bo rder  parity  and  (by giving up c o co a ’s surp lus  
generation role) sharply  raised them  as a percen tage  o f  
export  proceeds. Inflation exploded, food  p ro d u c tio n  
lagged, per capita  co n su m p tio n  was cut to r ib b o n s  to 
sustain high recurren t  service an d  capital  budgets .  
D iscontent becam e om nip resen t  — as d id its (fairly 
mild) repression. T he  productive  sec tor investm ent 
was in part  ill-designed (and  c o r ru p ted )  a n d  in pa r t  
delayed and  unable  to perform  in the worsen ing  m acro  
climate. O u tp u t  faltered. In 1966 the G h a n a ia n  a rm y  
moved and President N k ru m a h  was ove r th row n.
The first two military g overnm en ts  (1966-69) 
conducted  a B a n k /F u n d  advised stabil isa tion  — up to 
a point.  Private co n su m p tio n  was pa r t ly  res to red ,  an d  
military spending raised; external and  budge ta ry  
imbalances reduced — within  a basically sta tic  o u tp u t  
per capita.  A partial  recovery in cocoa  prices in 1966 
helped, but the real m o to r  for s tabil isa tion  was 
dem and  m anagem en t  — drastically  cutt ing  bo th  
investment and  non-m ili ta ry  governm en t  spending. 
The second civilian regime, whose econom ic  architect,  
J. H. M ensah, had  been N k r u m a h ’s m ain  econom ic
p la n n e r  until  the  early 1960s, sough t  to sus ta in  higher 
c o n s u m p t io n ,  re s to re  public  services a n d  re tu rn  to  the 
C P P 's  high in v e s tm e n t /h ig h  g row th  stra tegy  (no t  least 
by c o m p le t in g  the  inves tm ent p ro jec ts  in progress  
be fo re  the  1966 coup) .  W ith c o co a  prices again 
co llaps ing ,  a n d  this t ime paral le led  by declines in 
g ro w e r  prices abso lu te ly  an d  relative to b o rd e r  prices,  
a n d  c o n t in u e d  lags in inves tm en t  p a y o f f  a n d  food 
p r o d u c t io n ,  b o th  dom es tic  a n d  ex te rna l  im ba lances  
e x p lo d e d  a n d  su p p o r t  for  the  g o v e rn m e n t  im ploded.  
A n a t t e m p te d  d e v a lu a t io n  to limit im b a lan ce  a n d  ride 
o u t  the  s to rm  until  coco a  prices recovered  was 
fo l low ed  by an  o p p o r tu n is t ic  a rm y  c o u p  w rap p ed  in a 
p se u d o  popu l is t  m an t le  which  init ially gave it t rade  
u n io n  a n d  left su p p o r t .  Iron ica lly ,  w i th in  a few 
m o n th s  the  coco a  price  d id  reco v e r  in to  a t ran s i to ry  
1974 boom .
F r o m  1973 th ro u g h  1981 it is no t  possible to review 
e c o n o m ic  policy. T h e  crucial  poin t  is th a t  there  was no 
c o h e re n t  policy b u t  on ly  a s t re am  o f  inconsis tent  
s logans ,  o f  t e m p o ra ry  exped ien ts  a n d  o f  increasingly 
f ran t ic  sc ram b l in g  to sa lvage personal  a n d  n a r ro w  sub 
class in teres ts  o u t  o f  a steadily  sh r in k in g  pot.  Afte r  the 
1974 cocoa  b o o m  it was dow nhil l  all the  way —  for 
inves tm en t  (which  even in 1986 was still negative  at  net 
level using reasonab le  d ep rec ia t ion  est im ates) ,  public  
services, p e rsonal  services,  p e rsonal  c o n su m p tio n ,  
e c o n o m ic  b a lance ,  polit ica l c redib il i ty  a n d  public  
m ora l i ty .  Especially over  1979-81 ‘c h o p p in g  of f  the 
b a ck s id e ’ ( rou t in ised .  genera lised ,  h ierachical 
c o r ru p t io n )  b ecam e the  d o m in a n t  su b -m o d e  of  
exchange ,  a n d  survival the  cen tra l  con ce rn  o f  the  vast 
m a jo r i ty  o f  househo lds .  T h e  hopes a n d  expecta t ions 
o f  1957 indeed  seem ed to be a fa d in g  illusion a n d  a 
d is tan t  m em o ry  o f  a be trayed  past .
The First and Second Landings of the 
Flight Lieutenant
In  1979, th en  Flight  L ie u ten a n t  J e r ry  Rawlings led a 
c o u p  to  a t t e m p t  to re s to re  p ro b i ty  to  the  a rm e d  forces 
a n d  to  civil society. Its a n t i -co r ru p t io n  m easures  were 
d raco n ic ;  its an ti -p ro f i teer ing  eco n o m ic  policy 
d ra m a t i c  in m a k in g  exis ting  s tocks  m o re  available,  
less expensively.  It p res ided  over  a t ran s i t io n  to  an 
elected, p u rp o r ted ly  popul is t ,  g o v e rn m e n t  which soon 
reversed  the  pa r t ia l  c leans ing  a n d  w hich  faced the 
a f te r m a th  o f  fo rced  s to ck  r u n d o w n s  a n d  price cuts 
with no  paralle l  s t im u la t io n  o f  p ro d u c t io n .
As G h a n a  s tu m b le d  in to  its w ors t  e c o n o m ic  crisis, 
ch a rac te r ised  by h o r re n d o u s  im ba lances ,  falling 
o u tp u t ,  rising poverty ,  the o p en in g  o f  the c en tu ry ’s 
w ors t  th ree  year  d r o u g h t ,  hea l th  service co llapse  and 
the  r e tu rn  o f  tw o killer d iseases (yaw s a n d  yellow 
fever) w iped  o u t  a q u a r te r  c en tu ry  b e fo re ,  in the  dying 
d ay s  o f  1981, the  re t i red  F ligh t  L ie u ten a n t  re tu rn e d  at 
the  h e ad  o f  the  P N D C .  T h is  t im e he p ro p o se d  moral,
social,  polit ical an d  eco n o m ic  reconstruc t ion  — not  a 
o n e -o ff  c leansing a n d  handover .
1982 saw a go-i t-a lone  s tabil isa tion  and  ad jus tm ent 
e ffort .  C o c o a  was given p r io r ity  — h igher g row er 
prices ( f ro m  p e rh ap s  25 per cent o f  export  proceeds 
a n d  30 per  cen t  o f  b o rd e r  prices), p ro m p t  p ay m en t  (vs 
9 m o n th s  delay),  m ob il isa t ion  o f  la b o u r  an d  the 
r e m n a n ts  o f  the t r a n sp o r t  system. Price con tro ls  an d  
the  anti  c o r ru p t io n  drive pushed inflation under  25 per 
cent (vs 50-100 p e rc e n t  levels f rom  1975 on). T he  sta te  
g a ined  cred ib il i ty  as hav ing  public  (no t  merely  self  
in te res ted)  in ten t ions ,  concern  for civil society, some 
co h e re n t  idea  as to  what  it was doing, a capacity  to 
organ ise  a n d  a llocate  resources to pr iority  ends.
But it was to o  late for  a na t iona lly  engineered  
tu rn a ro u n d .  E xpor ts  an d  gov e rn m en t  revenue could  
no t  be ra ised  e n o u g h  to break the im p o r t  an d  fiscal 
noo se  c h o k in g  the life o u t  o f  the  econom y,  the public  
services a n d  civil society. T h e  1973-81 record placed 
in te rn a t io n a l  credib il i ty  —  a n d  financia l su p p o r t  — 
o u t  o f  reach;  a result re inforced by the people’s pow er 
rhe to r ic  a n d  policy o f  the  P N D C  and  the implacab le  
hostili ty to it o f  the Reagan adm in is t ra t ion .
As 1982 w a n ed  — a n d  the  d ro u g h t  waxed —  the 
P N D C  d ec ided  th a t  the  only way to b reak  ou t  of  
decline was to secure  the ex ternal  resources to restore 
im p o r ts  to revitalise capacity ,  rehab ili ta te  infra­
s t ru c tu re ,  regain  p roduc tive  advance.  A nd  the only 
way to  d o  th a t  was to go to  the I M F  a n d  W orld  Bank 
on  the ir  term s,  nego tia t ing  f rom  an  historic  
(G h a n a ia n )  reco rd  o f  no  p e rfo rm an ce ,  a n d  a present 
fo u n d a t io n  o f  a c ru m b l in g  eco n o m y  an d  society.
Stabilisation: The Programme Evolves
T he  1983-85 S ta b i l i sa t io n /A d ju s tm e n t  p ro g ram m e  
was basically  t rad i t io n a l  o r  new o r th o d o x  with one 
excep tion ,  a de libera te  im m edia te  target to increase 
im p o r t  c apac i ty  via increased concessional finance. 
T h e  p ro g ra m m e  was based  on an initial shock  
t re a tm e n t  —  p a r t icu la r ly  in respect to the  exchange  
ra te  — fo l low ed  by su s ta in ed  g rad u a l ism  a n d  
s u p p o r te d  by increas ing  real resource  inflows over 
1983-86. Its m ain  e lem ents  were:
D evaluation  —  shock  t re a tm e n t  in 1983 f rom  Cedi 2.75 
to 30 to the  US $ fo l low ed  by a d o w n w a rd  crawl in 
1984 to  Cedi  50 to the  $ a n d  60 at the end o f  1985. This 
was fo l low ed by a second  shock  dev a lu a t io n  to  Cedi 90 
to the $. A th ird  sho ck  t r ea tm e n t  was m oving  to  a 
m an a g ed  a u c t io n  system in the second  ha lf  o f  1986 
with a year  end  ( a n d  m id  1987) ra te  o f  150 Cedi per $ 
(vs a paralle l  ra te  o f  the o rd e r  o f  200).
Fiscal policy called fo r  reducing  the  g o vernm en t  
b o rrow ing  req u irem en t ,  initially largely by expenditure  
cuts  w hen g o v e rn m e n t  sp e n d in g  was u n d e r  10 per cent 
o f  G D P  a n d  the  b o r ro w in g  requ irem en t  under  
three per  cent.
M onetary  policy was designed to  hold  d o m es tic  c redit  
fo rm at io n  below 20 per cent ( largely by reducing  
g o v e rn m en t  b o rrow ing)  a n d  to  achieve posi t ive  real 
interest rates to raise dom estic  savings. By 1985 
interest rates had reached 20 pe r  cent.
Cocoa  prices were to  be raised rap id ly  in real as well as 
n om ina l  term s consis ten t  with ra is ing the  net 
g o v e rn m en t  revenue, because  with massive  
d ev a lu a t io n ,  dom es tic  prices a n d  C o c o a  B o a rd  costs  
would grow  less rapid ly  th an  Cedi receipts. A d d i t io n a l  
foreign resources were to  be m obil ised  f rom  the F u n d ,  
Bank an d  b ila tera ls  to  f inance  ad d i t io n a l  im p o r ts ,  
service existing deb t  an d  reduce arrears .
Liberalisation  included en d in g  a lm o s t  all price 
con tro ls  (which were virtually to ta l ly  ineffective) a n d  
—  except fo r  cocoa ,  shea  n u ts  a n d  p a lm  oil —  all 
ceiling ag r icu ltu ra l  pu rch ase  prices (which  affec ted  a 
negligible p ro p o r t io n  o f  o u tp u t  in 1983). It a lso 
included n o -quest ions-asked  licensing o f  ‘no  fo rex ’ 
im por ts  to cap tu re  the proceeds o f  o u tw a rd  sm ugg l ing  
a n d  rem it tances  f rom  G h a n a ia n s  a b ro a d .  Im port 
licensing, except fo r  ‘no  fo rex ’ im p o r ts ,  was to  be 
re ta ined  a n d  m ade  m o re  efficient by sys tem at ic  
priorit isa tion.
Inflation  was to be reduced sharp ly  f rom  the 50 per  cent 
to 116 per cent ra tes  which  h a d  ch ara c te r i s ed  the  late  
1970s and  early 1980s (a lbeit  the  1982 ra te  h a d  been 
22 per  cent). This was seen as poss ib le  b ecause  for 
most t ransac tions  prices were re la ted  to  the paralle l  
exchange rate.
Results 1983-86 — The Programme Produces
T he  p ro g ra m m e ’s results were m ixed b u t  in its ow n 
term s basically satisfactory.  Price increases rose  to 
122 p e rcen t  in 1983 (145 p e rc e n t  food  a n d  100 p e rc e n t  
non-food)  bu t  fell to  40 per  cent  in 1984 (11 pe r  cent 
food  an d  69 p e rce n t  non-food)  a n d  12 per cent in 1985 
(-11 per cent food  a n d  50 pe r  cent  n o n - fo o d )  before  
rising to 23 p e rce n t  (ab o u t  15 a n d  30 p e r c e n t )  in 1986. 
The  n a tu re  o f  the price change  p a t t e rn  bears  o u t  th a t  
most prices as o f  1983 had  been closer to the parallel  
th an  the official exchange ra te .  H ow ever ,  it also 
indicates that  a substantia l  p o r t io n  (slightly over  half) 
o f  1983’s accelerated  infla tion re la ted  to p r im ar i ly  
w ea th e r  induced  food  price rises an d  the  bu lk  o f  the  
subsquen t  fall to w eather  re la ted  food  price 
stabil isation.
M oney supply  increases were low. G o v e rn m en t  b ank  
borrow ing  requirements  fell. Enterprise  credit  d e m a n d  
rem ained  low an d  banks  began to refuse savings an d  
time deposi ts ,  creating  a so m ew hat  artificial stabil ity . 
By the second ha lf  o f  1986 the liquidity  p ro b lem  had  
becom e acute.  Banks were unable  to ex tend  e n ough  
credit  or  to mobilise enough  currency  for all viable 
enterprises to meet the condit ions  o f  the forex auction .
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T he  basic reason was the artificial cur ta i lm en t  ol 
deposit  (especially interest bear ing  deposit)  levels. 
G D P rose  7.6 per cent in 1984, 5.3 per cent in 1985 an d  
5.6 per cent in 1986 — the first t im e per cap ita  G D P  
had  risen in three consecutive  years since the 1950s. 
This g row th  was fairly widely d is t r ibu ted  sectorally, 
albeit the high 1984 level relates in large part  to 
weather  related food  c rop  harvest recovery. E xports  
fell sharp ly  f rom  $641 mn in 1982 (an d  $1,104 m n  in 
1980) to $441 in 1983. partly  on  volume decline related 
to weather and  continuing infrastructure  de ter io ra t ion ,  
and  partly  to price changes. 1 he 1984 recovery to 
$566 m n was d o m in a ted  by favourab le  price changes,  
but those  o f  1985 to $632 m n an d  1986 to $773 m n did 
reflect substantia l  o u tp u t  increases.
Public Services  provision was badly  hit by b udge ta ry  
curta ilm ent  in 1983. as w'as public  in fras truc tura l  
investment.  The  ra tio  o f  bud g e ta ry  sp end ing  to  G D P  
fell to ab o u t  6.5 per cent (5.5 per cent re cu rren t  an d  
1 per cent capital) and  o f  revenue to 5.4 per cent. 
Furthe r ,  the con tro l  m e th o d  used o f  centralised, 
specific releases o f  funds  fo r  a wide range  o f  i tems, 
while effective in cur ta il ing  expenditu re ,  a lso curta ils  
its efficiency. The overem ploym en t/underem ploym en t 
p roblem has yet to be tackled squarely.  In the most 
overstaffed p a ras ta ta l  — the C o co a  B oard  — 
em ploym ent  at 89,000 to 110,000 (d ep en d in g  on 
coverage) could sensibly be cut no t  by  16,000 as 
achieved but to 16,000 (or p e rh ap s  25,000 including 
certain rela ted activities).  T o  do so is crit ical to ra is ing 
the grow ers’ share  in export  proceeds w ithou t  crea ting  
fiscal havoc. But such cuts  are  only possible if 
replanting  an d  field s ta ff  laid o f f  can be a l located  
rep lan ted  — o r  rep lan tab le  — areas a n d  assisted in 
becoming cocoa (o r  o ther  crop) farmers.
The need to raise — not lower —  the B u d g e t / G D P  
ratio  is now recognised, an d  indeed it has recovered  to 
abou t  12 per cent (9 per cent recu rren t ,  3 per cent 
capital) on expenditu re  an d  9 per  cent on revenue side, 
with rehabili tation p ro g ram m es  for educa tion  an d  
health begun. Revenue rais ing priorit ies, however,  
appear  odd, as w'ell as rais ing p rob lem s for the access 
of  poor  people and  vulnerable  groups.  A rem arkab le  
num ber  o f  low unit  value, high adm in is tra t ive  cost fees 
are being in troduced,  but sales an d  excise taxes,  with 
few exceptions, rem ain  derisory  (1.5 per cent on 
schnapps,  as a p ro p o r t io n  o f  retail price) partly  at  least 
because old specific rates have been raised ra th e r  than  
converted to ad valorem  scales at plausible levels.
The priorities for f ix e d  capita l fo rm ation  a re  now  
rehabili tation and  bottleneck break ing ,  albeit some 
project priorit ies a p p ea r  o d d  — e.g. a low traffic new 
highway from Accra  to the Ivory C oast  b o rd e r  while 
the main north  h ighway is om it ted ,  despite  f inance 
from ID A  secured in 1987. How ever ,  G F C F ’s 
absolute  level appea rs  dangerously  low when 
com pared  to plausible deprec ia t ion  estimates. Net
fixed cap i ta l  fo rm a t io n  was 0.5 per  cent  in 1982 on 
w ha t  was even then a ra th e r  low d eprec ia t ion  estimate. 
It h;is risen to 5.4 per cent in 1985 largely because  the 
e s t im a ted  d ep rec ia t ion  rate has been halved, o therw ise  
it w o u ld  be 2.0 per cent. Indeed ,  on  d e p re c ia t io n /  
cap i ta l  stock p rocedure s  c o m p a ra b le  to those  used in a 
s tu d y  o f  Z im b a b w e  it is negative. T he  dom es tic  savings 
ra te  rem a in s  low — p e rh ap s  6 per cent gross  in 1985 
a n d  8 per  cent in 1986 but virtually negative  at net 
level. Still , gross  inves tm ent is rising in real te rm s an d  
is p ro b a b ly  given m ore  careful  a n d  a r t icu la ted  
a t te n t io n  th an  at any time since the early 1920s.
No time for Triumphalism: Problems and 
Problematics
Several p rob lem s w ith o u t  c lear  answ ers  rem a in  a n d  — 
as a result  — the sus ta inab i l i ty  o f  the  p ro g ra m m e  
rem a in s  p ro b lem at ic .  T o  da te  G h a n a ’s luck since 1983 
has been g o o d  (early  cocoa  price rise, re tu rn  o f  good  
w ea th e r ,  oil price s lum p).  1987 has been  m uch  m ore  
m ixed (cocoa  price fall, p o o r  w eather ,  pa r tia l  oil price 
sn a p b a ck )  which suggests bo th  g rea te r  external 
ba lance  a n d  food  supply  s tra ins — bo th  tend ing  to 
pu sh  up  infla tion a n d  to ho ld  d o w n  grow th .
Cocoa  is a key p ro b lem .  Official pu rchases  by 1990 can 
p ro b a b ly  be p u sh e d  over 300,000 to n n es  as a result of  
m o re  sm ugg l ing  clawed back ,  be tte r  input  supply,  
init ial p a y o f f  f rom  re p lan tin g  a n d  new p lan ting .  But 
w i th  M a lay s ia ’s g ro w th  f rom  n o w h ere  in 1980 to 
nearly  100,000 tonnes  now, an d  to over  200,000 by 
1990 (on  trees a lready  p lan ted),  N iger ia ’s export 
recovery ,  Ivory  C o a s t ’s co n t in u e d  e xpans ion ,  what 
will h a p p en  to the price? By 1990 cocoa  export  
e a rn in g s  at 300-325,000 to n n es  cou ld  be be low  1986 at 
225,000 tonnes .  F u r th e r ,  if the w orld  price falls, the 
30 per  cent g row er ,  35 per cent  C o c o a  B oard ,  35 per 
cent  T reasu ry  split o f  p roceeds  will not p rovide  
a d e q u a te  incentives. T o  da te  only the  edges o f  the 
m o n s t ro u s  o v e rem p lo y m e n t  (equ iva len t  to the private  
sec to r  o r  all o th e r  pa ras ta ta l s )  a n d  cost ( including 
t r a n s p o r t )  excesses o f  the C o c o a  B o a rd  have  been 
c h ip p ed  at; large revenue cuts  are  hard ly  w hat  the 
T rea su ry  needs.
F ood  prices s t a n d  at  70 per  cent  o f  a 1977 base  o f  100 
(c o m p a re d  to cost o f  living), p ro b ab ly  the  lowest index 
since the  end  o f  the  1950s. W h a t  im p ac t  will this  have 
on  o u tp u t?  T o  the early 1990s the g o v e rn m e n t  projects 
4 p e rce n t  annual  g row th  and  the W orld  Bank 2 pe rcen t  
aga ins t  p o p u la t io n  g ro w th  o f a b o u t  3 p e rce n t .  Neither 
e s t im a te  seems firmly based  o r  to  deal explicit ly with 
d ro u g h ts .  T h e i r  d ivergence is crucial .  T w o  per cent 
g ro w th ,  m ore  likely on  the past record  an d  1986 prices, 
th rea ten s  econom ic ,  social a n d  polit ical stabil ity . F o u r  
pe r  cent  w ou ld  help c o n so l id a te  it. T h is  p rob lem  
rela tes  to  the  simple  fact th a t  in p ract ice  there  is no 
c o h eren t  ag r icu ltu ra l  policy, an d  the ministry  appears
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to have ne ither  the  financia l resources, the da ta ,  the 
pe rsonnel  n o r  the first h and  con tac t  with peasants  to 
crea te  one.
Labour a n d  wages 'are a po ten t ia l  t im e-bom b. G h a n a ’s 
T U C  has helped instal — and  tea r  down — every 
p rev ious  g o v e rn m en t.  Now, despite  a 1983-87 
d o u b l in g  o f  real wages (adm itted ly  together  with 
a llow ances  still a m o u n t in g  to only half  o f  a p o o r  
u rb a n  h o u se h o ld ’s ac tua l  c o n su m p tio n  basket — see 
e.g. T a b le  4), the  T U C  is open ly  hostile  to and  
obstruc tive  o f  the P N D C .
E xterna l fin a n ce  is barely  ad eq u a te  —  it will not cover 
any  su d d e n  shock  ( inc lud ing  a yea r’s fall in 
C o n su l ta t iv e  G r o u p  pledges). Because o f  past soft  
loan  gaps,  d eb t  service has risen to over 60 per cent o f  
gross  loan an d  g ran t  inflows.  Any ba lancing  to 1990 
(w ith o u t  h a z a rd o u s  use o f  hard  finance) depends  on 
the I M F  su b s ti tu t in g  S truc tu ra l  A djus tm en t  Facilities 
fo r  repu rch ases  fall ing due  u n d e r  past 1983 standbys.  
T h u s  any  b reach  o f  a p e rfo rm an ce  (trigger) clause 
cou ld  b r in g  d o w n  the whole  external finance s tructure .
G h a n a  is suffer ing  from  ad ju s tm e n t  fa tigue —  five 
y ea rs ’ h a rd  slog leaves m an y  people  a n d  officials 
d ra ined .  But re laxa tion  w ou ld  not be safe — indeed 
the 1987-89 m o v em en t  to full O pen  G enera l  Licence, 
20 to  30 pe r  cent u n i fo rm  tariffs ,  a revised tax system 
a n d  full p a ras ta ta l  re form  could  well prove h a rd e r  to 
a r t icu la te  a n d  to  m an a g e  th a n  p rev ious  stages. If  any  
o f  the p ro b lem  areas cited above  goes seriously w rong, 
there  will be a full b low n crisis which the very fragile 
eco n o m ic  a n d  social recovery is hardly  yet in a 
posi t ion  to face.
This  is not to say G h a n a ’s p ro g ra m m e  is d o o m ed .  Fa r  
f rom  it: its fragility  is less th an  in any prev ious year. 
But the c reep ing  co n d it io n a l i ty  to w a rd  full l iberali­
sa t ion  f rom  the Bank ,  the weaknesses o f  the real 
e co n o m y  a n d  the g row ing  a d ju s tm en t  fatigue do  m ean 
th a t  t r iu m p h a l  m arch  music is still dangerously  
p rem a tu re .
Where Human Conditions Decay: Limitations
of Success
Per c ap i ta  G D P  in G h a n a  is at best two th irds w hat  it 
was in 1960. T he  1960-1970s ad vance  in h u m a n  
c o n d i t io n s  ind ica to rs  (T ab le  3) had  been crucially 
reversed  th ro u g h  1983 an d ,  at best,  has held  its own 
except for  m aln u t r i t io n  an d  conce ivably  the p e rc e n t  in 
ab so lu te  poverty  since. In 1986 with over five per cent 
real g ro w th ,  per cap i ta  c o n su m p t io n  fell three p e rc e n t  
a p p a re n t ly  f ro m  d e m a n d  overkill  a n d  lower real cash 
incom es fo r  food  selling peasan ts .  T h e  governm en t  
health  sys tem  (exclud ing  the re la ted  C hr is t ian  Heal th  
A ssoc ia t ion  o f  G h a n a )  saw its real o u tp u t  plunge 
50 per cen t  f rom  1979 th ro u g h  1983; the e duca tion
system is barely a vo id ing  collapse; the  ru ral  w a ter  
system has no assured  capacity  for m ain tenance .
Assum ing  that  developm ent is a b o u t ,  fo r  a n d  by 
people ,  and  th a t  im ba lances  be tw een  basic  needs a n d  
the real incomes a n d  access to  services o f  the  p o o r  
m at te r ,  th a t  is a d isa s t ro u s  record .  At the  end  o f  fo u r  
years o f  s tab i l isa t ion  an d  three  o f  rap id  g ro w th  it is an 
ind ic tm ent o f  G h a n a ’s s tabil isa tion  s tra tegy as a t  best 
integrally incom plete  and  at  wors t  focused solely  on 
m ac ro eco n o m ic  res to ra t ion  while people  c o n t in u e d  to 
decay.
This  is em pha t ica l ly  n o t  to  a rgue  th a t  the  severe 
decline in h u m an  cond it ions  has been caused  by the  
stabil isa tion  p ro g ram m e.  1966-1981 (especially 1973- 
81) econom ic  policy a n d  non-po l icy  m ust  b e a r  
p r im ary  responsib ili ty ,  a n d  ex ternal  shocks  (no t  least 
the 1981-83 d rough t)  secondary .  C o n t in u a t io n  o f  the  
1979-81 drift o r  even the 1982 s tabil isa tion  w ithou t  
in te rna t ional  su p p o r t  s tra tegy w ou ld  no t  have m eant 
p o o r  G h a n a ia n s  were less p o o r  to d ay  —  quite  the 
contrary .
N o r  has the p ro g ram m e  as im p lem en ted  h a rm e d  them  
by what it did, except for  a t t e m p ts  in 1983-84 to 
restore fiscal ba lance  by cu tt ing  real recu rren t  
spending. M ore  p o o r  an d  vu lnerab le  people  have  been 
m ade  less p o o r  a n d / o r  vu lnerab le  since 1983 th a n  the 
reverse. But that  defence is no t  good  enough .  T he  
absence  o f  in tegrat ing  h u m an  im ba lance  s tab il isa tion  
in to  the p ro g ra m m e ’s core  s tra tegy  was —  a n d  to a 
large extent remains —  a basic flaw.
Basic health ,  educa tion  an d  w a ter  sources  raise 
p roductiv i ty  now an d  in the fu ture .  The  sick, ill iterate 
an d  p o o r  can n o t  w ork  long, h a rd ,  o r  productively .  
T he  failure to secure funds to  resto re  the m ain  
h ighway to the north  until  1987 has d isad v an tag e d  
bo th  th a t  trio  o f  p o o r  regions a n d  their  p o o r  people ,  
an d  limited p roduc tion  recovery. So have agr icu ltu ra l,  
u rb a n  and  public  works s trategies that failed to 
identify ways to enable p o o r  people  to p ro d u ce  m ore  
a n d  to utilise G h a n a ’s one a b u n d a n t  f a c to r  o f  
p roduc tion  — labour  — more fully.
It would  not be fair  to b lame p rimari ly  the  F u n d  o r  the 
B ank for this — especially f rom  1985 o n w ard .  The  
Bank may have trea ted  health, educa tion ,  the h ighway 
to the no r th  and  lab o u r  intensive public  w orks  as ad d  
ons —  but it has m oved to back ing  them  firmly, which 
some observers would argue is m ore  than  could  be said 
until  1987 o f  the G h a n a ia n  m inistr ies o f  F inance  an d  
Agriculture.  The  P N D C  leadership has not been fully 
agreed on priorit ies and  sequencies. Only in April 1987 
did G h a n a  take a subs tan tia l  p ro d u c tio n  and  
productiv i ty  package by and  for the p o o r  to the 
C onsu lta t ive  G ro u p ,  an d  even now the idea that 
a d ju s tm en t  with a h u m an  face is ab o u t  p roduc tive  and  
a llocationa l  efficiency is far from fully in tegrated  into 
m acroeconom ic  program m ing.
Where Now? What Chance?
F o r  the P N D C .  success o f  the p ro g ram m e  is vital to its 
survival an d  to  its a t te m p t  to recreate a part ic ipa to ry ,  
dem ocra t ic  polit ical process. F o r  the  m ajo r i ty  of 
G h a n a ia n s  success is crucial to any  a llevia tion  from  
misery. Indeed for m o re  than  a few the  s ta rk  m eaning  
o f  failure would  be seen in rising infant m orta l i ty  an d  
falling life expectancy. T he  West African  p roverb  
applies — give a rich m an  less food  an d  he will grow 
thin; give a poor  m an  less food  an d  he will die.
F o r  the F u n d  a n d  the  Bank, G h a n a  m at te rs  beyond  
the  f inance  they have  su n k  in it f ro m  1983 on 
(a p p ro a c h in g  $1,000 m n  a t  c o m m i tm e n t  level). If the 
longest runn ing ,  a rg u ab ly  successful s ta b i l i s a t io n /  
a d ju s tm e n t  p ro g ra m m e  collapses,  their  credibili ty  in 
su b -S a h a ra n  Africa is likely to fall with it.
Desp i te  the l im ita t ions  to da te  a n d  the  p rob lem at ics  
fo r  the  fu tu re ,  th a t  necessity o f  c o n t in u e d  an d  
b ro a d e n e d  success m ay  help win the strugg le  to w ard  
it. T o o  m an y  people  an d  inst i tu t ions  (an d  no t  ju s t  in 
G h a n a )  have too  m uch  r iding on it to accept  failure
Table I Average Growth Rates Key Economic Indicators  1965-83 (per cent)
h e m 1965-73 1973-83
1. Population1 2.2 3.1
2. Domestic production'*
(a) G D P 3.4 -1 .3
(b) G D P  per capita 1.2 -4 .4
(c) Agriculture 4.5 0.0
(d) Industry 4.3 -7 .0
(e) Services 1.1 -0 .3
3. Merchandise trade
(a) Exports3 3.5 -6 .4
(b) Im p o r ts3 -3 .3 -8 .0
(c) Term s o f  t rade — -6 .5
4. Cocoa production1*
5. Food sector
(a) F o o d  p ro d u c t io n 1' 2.0 -2 .7
(b) Fo o d  p ro d u c tio n  per cap i ta0 -0 .3 -5 .9
(c) Calorie availabili ty per cap i ta0 1.3 -3 .9
(i) from cereals 3.8 -3 .3
(ii) from roo ts  an d  tubers -2 .0 -1 .8
(d) Protein availabili ty per cap i ta0 4.1 -4 .0
6. Inflation
(a) C onsum er  prices 6 .3d 49.9°
(b) F o o d  (local an d  im ported)  prices 6 .6d 53.2°
(c) N on-food  prices 5.8d 46 .5C
N o te s :a W orld Bank, 1985.
b Based on data provided by G hana C ocoa Board. 1986.
FA O  and F A O  com puter print-outs, 1986. 
ll Based on data in Bequele. 1980, A ppendix T able 7 w ith the w eights for local and im ported  food  (0 .5207  and 0 .0295) 
from the W orld Bank.
Based on data from  G hana Central Bureau o f  Statistics.
Source: Adapted from  1986 1LO W orking Paper bv T. T abatabai.
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w ithou t  a last ditch fight. G h a n a ’s self confidence is 
g row ing ,  as is g lobal  con f idence  in her. Every year o f  
success (p ro b ab ly  every year o f  avoiding failure) 
s t ren g th en s  the  e co n o m y ,  the  civil society, the chances 
o f  r id ing  o u t  serious negative shocks,  when they com e 
(as they will).
If Z am b ia  over 1976-87 is evidence o f  how little a 
decade  o f  s tab il isa tion  can p roduce,  G h a n a  is evidence 
th a t  so m e th in g  can be w on,  even after  a decade  an d  a 
h a l f  o f  decline.  It m ay  yet jo in  Z im b ab w e  an d  
T a n z a n ia  in d e m o n s tr a t in g  tha t  the provision o f  
services to  p o o r  people  can  be built  in to  the core o f  a 
s ta b i l i s a t io n /a d ju s tm e n t  p rog ram m e.  The  Black S tar
is no longer setting, the battle  to sus ta in  its second 
rising is one in which the  F u n d ,  the  B ank  a n d  the 
P N D C  have all m ade  e r ro rs  b u t  have  —  to  d a te  — 
m anaged  to  work  toge the r  w i th o u t  m a jo r  a n ta g o n is t ic  
con trad ic t io n s  at the o p e ra t io n a l  level. If  six m o re  
years (1988-93) o f  large soft  re sou rce  in jec tions can  be 
secured, im provem en ts  in h u m a n  co n d it io n s  m ad e  
in tegral  to the  p ro g ram m e ,  massive  sho ck  a v o id e d  (o r  
f inanced)  —  then fo u r  to five per cent  g ro w th  a n d  
steady im p ro v em en t  in h u m an  co n d i t io n  ind ica to rs  
will be sus ta inab le  an d  largely se lf-susta in ing,  
hum an ly ,  socially an d  polit ically, as well as 
m acroeconom ically .
Table 2 M a jo r  E co n o m ic  and F in a n c ia l In d ica to rs  1 9 8 4 -8 9
(Provisional) 







G D P 8.6% 5.1% 5.3% 5.5% 5.0% 5.3% 5.3%
G D P  defla to r 35.3% 31.2% 30.2% 18.2% 18.0% 12.5% 7.5%
Percent o f market price G DP  
National accounts
C o n su m p t io n 95.1% 95.7% 92.3% 95% 89.8% 86.7% 85.0%
Investm ent 7.6% 7.3% 10.3% 14% 17.1% 21.0% 22.8%
Priva te 4.0% 3.4% 4.4% 5% 7.9% 11.1% 11.9%)
Budgetary  capital  expendi tu res 3.6% 3.8% 5.9% 9% 9.2% 9.9% 10.8%,
N a t io n a l  savings 4.7% 3.1% 6.6% 6% 8.5% 12.2% 14.8%
Public -0 .4 % 0.1% 1.7% 2% 3.2% 3.5% 3.6%
Private 5.1% 3.0% 4.8% 4% 5.3% 8.7% 11.2%
O f  which: foreign transfers 1.0% 0.5% 0.9% 1% 1.3%; 2.0% 2.8%
Fore ign  savings 2.8% 4.2% 3.7% 7% 8.6%) 8.8% 7.9%,
Central government budget
T o ta l  revenues 8.0% 10.4% 13.6% 12% 16.1%) 16.2% 16.5%
Tota l  expend i tu re 11.8% 14.1% 17.8% 20% 22.8%) 23.6% 24.4%
Recurren t 8.4% 10.3% 11.9% 11% 12.9%) 12.7% 12.9%
C apita l 3.4% 3.8% 5.9% 6% 9.2% 9.9% 10.8%
Special efficiency 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3% 0.7% 0.9% 0.6%
Overall  deficit 3.8% 3.8% 4.1% 8% 6.6% 7.4% 7.9%
Balance of payments
E xpor ts  o f  G N F S 8.0% 9.9% 15.8% 14% 21.7% 22.2% 22.7%
Im p o r ts  o f  G N F S -1 0 .7 % -1 2 .9 %  --18.5% -2 0 % -28.6%. -3 0 .0 % -30.5%
R esource  ba lance -2 .7 % -3 .0 % -2 .6% - 6 % -7.0%) -7 .7 % -7 .8 %
C u rre n t  a cc o u n t  ba lance -2 .8 % -4 .2 % -3 .7% - 8 % -8.6%) -8 .8 % -7 .9 %
Overall  ba lance -1 .6 % -1 .7 % -1 .1% +2% 2.8% 3.0% 2.5%
Broad money (M 2) 15 12 16 15 18 20 22
COL 40 10 23 15 — — —
Source: A dapted  from  G overnm ent o f  G han a  1987 E con om ic Recovery Program m e Presentation to C onsultative G roup
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Low  Incom e suh- 
S  a ha ran A frica  
1982
1. Average life expectancy at  hirth 45 49 55 53 48
2. Infünt mortality rate 132 107 86 107-120 118
3. Child death rate 27 21 15 25-30 24
4. Access to health facility11 — — — 30 45
5. Public health facility visits
per person per year — — 0.7 0.4 21
6. Health budget as % of G D P — 1.2 — 0.26 0.95
7. Access to pure water1
Rural — 14 14 48 14
U rban — 86 86 75 62
Total — 35 35 60 22
8. Access to excreta disposal11
Rural — 40 40 30 25
U rban — 92 95 65 69
Total — 55 56 44 32
9. Average calorie availability
as a % of requirements 92 97 88 68 91
10. Child malnutrition
(moderate /severe) — — 36 50-55 40
11. Primary  education enrolment
ratioe 38(46) 64(75) 69(80) -(80) 69(—)
12. Adult literacy 27 30 — 35-45 44
13. Education budget as % of G D P — 3.9 — 0.85 2.81
14. Proportion of population below 
absolute poverty line1
Rural — — 60-65 67-1 /2 -
7 2-1 /2
65
Urban — — 30-35 45-50 35
Principal Sources: W orld Bank. C om parative A nalysis and D ata D iv is io n . E con om ic A nalysis and P rojection s D epartm ent 
(June 1984). W orld D evelop m en t Report 1985; U N IC E F . S tatistics on C hildren in U N IC E F  A ssisted  
C ountries (April 1985); U N IC E F  G hana: S ituation  A nalysis o f  W om en and C hildren (Ju ly 1984).
Notes: a 1960 data refer to a year betw een 1959 and 1961; 1970 betw een 1969 and 1971; late 1970s betw een 1975 and 1980; 
1980s to 1982. 1984 or 1985.
h Defined in terms o f  location within a 5 kilom etre radius. M ay overstate for urban p op u lation  when facilities 
available are sm all to serve the entire p op ulation  n om inally  w ith in reach o f  them .
L 1970 and late 1970s urban figures m ay be overstated by failing to relate num ber o f  water po in ts to  p op ulation . 
d 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possib ly  rural areas overstate  by fa ilin g  to  relate num ber o f  d rop -h o les to 
supposed user population .
c Adjusted for length o f  prim ary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted  figures. B ecause o f  the p r im ary /m id d le  sch o o l d ivision  
G hana has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
1 Estimate m ade by author on basis o f  fragm entary data.
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Table 4 Reconstructed Budget Accounts Clerk Late 1985
Income C edi
Net pay slip 2,150
H o u s in g  a l low ance 430
O th e r  a llow ances 570
Tips ,  sales m em os ,  etc. 1,250 (4,250)
Wife —  vegetable  selling 3,500
Wife —  o th e r  in form al 500 (4,000)
O th e r  h o u se h o ld  m em bers 750 ( 750)
Total income 9,000
Expenditure
Pay day  c h o p  (‘day  we m ust  en joy ’) 750 (1,3)
W eek en d  c h o p  (evening only) 3,000 (1,2)
W eekend  c h o p  (m o rn in g /e v en in g ) 1,600 (1,2)
O th e r  c h o p 500 (2)
C h i ld re n ’s fo o d  p ocket  m oney 400 (2)
C le rk ’s lunch m oney 400 (1) (6,650)
T ra n s p o r t  to  work  (c o m m u n a l  taxi) 600 (1)
Rent 300 (1)
W ate r /e lec tr ic i ty 150 (1)
E d u c a t io n /m e d ic a l ,  etc. 100 (2)
C lo th in g /h o u se h o ld  supplies 600 (2,4)
F o o tb a l l / lo t t o /b e e r /c ig a r e t t e s 600 (1,5)
Total expenditure 9.000
N otes:
(1) Paid by clerk or m ixed.
(2) D om in an tly  paid by wife.
(3) C hicken Cedi 450; oth er Cedi 300.
(4) Im plicitly  '/2 shirt, 1 m etre c lo th , 2 cakes soap  a m onth.
(5) Im plicitly  3 bottles beer, 40 cigarettes, 1 football m atch , 2 L otto  form s a m onth.
Source: A dapted  F rom  W est A frica  27-1-86 and fragm entary data on expenditure, incom e patterns. E stim ate roughly squares
with W orld Bank quasi survey suggesting  w age earning hou sehold  expenditure four tim es wages and over tw o thirds 
on food . Raises d ou b ts as to  appropriateness 50 per cent food  w eight in C ost o f  Living Index.
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Europe and the In te rnation al Division of Labour -  
EEC and the Third  W orld : A Survey 6
The economic  re la t io nsh ip  between the EEC and 
the Third  W orld  has t ra d i t io n a l ly  been c lose, but 
Europe’s econom ic  s t ruc tu re  is chang ing .  How 
have these changes a ffected the EEC-Third W or ld  
re lat ionship, and is Europe d isengag ing  f ro m  the 
Third  World?
Europe and the In te rn atio n a l D ivision of Labour, the
s ixth  vo lum e in the Third  W o rld  Survey series,
beg ins  w i th  a set of b road  a n a lyse s  co ve r in g  the 
cha ng ing  pa t te rn  of EEC t ra de  p o l icy ,  European 
fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t  in d e ve lo p in g  cou n tr ie s ,  and 
the im p a c t  of en la rge m en t .  M ore  spe c if ic  regional 
cha p te rs  in ve s t ig a te  changes  in EEC re la t ionsh ips  
w i th  the A f r ican ,  C ar ibbean  and Pac if ic  (ACP) 
c ou n tr ies ,  Sou th  East As ia , and the  Gulf Oil 
p roduce rs .
1987 173pp ISBN 0 340 41058 2 published by Hodder 
& S toughton and ava ilab le  at £11.95 from  Publications 
Office, Ins titu te  of Developm ent S tudies, U n ive rs ity  of 
Sussex, B righton BN1 9RE, UK
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The  IDS Bulletin is publ ished quar ter ly  in J an u a ry ,  April ,  July 
and  October .  It began in 1966 and  its main  aim has always been to 
publ ish brief, direct articles on development  problems, and to 
co m m unica te  research findings to a b ro ad  consti tuency.  Issues 
are edi ted  by Fel lows o f  IDS,  each o f  w h o m  selects a theme of  
topical  im por tance  to all those working on Th ird  World  
problems: research workers ,  teachers,  students,  administ ra tors  
and civil servants.  Th e IDS Bulletin has a well deserved reputa t ion 
for r igour and fresh thinking.  Nevertheless it deliberately adopts  a 
style, vocabulary  and  emphasis  designed to make  it accessible to 
intellectually oriented policy makers and pract it ioners,  who may 
wish to avoid  the detail and extensive references provided in other 
academic  journals .  Thus ,  it provides a readable,  mainly no n ­
technical  ent ry into the current  debates by contr ibutors  who 
combine  the perspectives o f  both  theory  and practice.  The print 
run is 2.600 and  dist r ibution is worldwide.  Th e IDS Bulletin is 
sent free to selected Thi rd  W or ld  institutions.
Th e Ins ti tute publ ishes three occasional  series: Research Reports, 
Commissioned Studies, and Discussion Papers. The Annual Report, 
Publications Sales Catalogue and  Prospectus are available on
request  from:
IDS Publicat ions  
Inst itute of  Development  Studies 
at the Inst itute o f  Sussex 
Br ighton BN 1 9RE 
England
